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PARFUMS CHRISTIAN DIOR SA & ANOR V. EVORA
BV
DOUGLAS R. HEGG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Unrestricted trade is an essential step in the equalization and inte-
gration of the European Community.1 This case note proposes that the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) is correct in encouraging parallel im-
ports as a means of promoting unrestricted intra-Community trade.
Similarly, assuming parallel imports provide an important benefit to
the community, manufacturers should not be able to side-step such
benefits by imposing artificial limits on parallel importers' ability to ad-
vertise the products legally imported and offered for sale. Parfumes
Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV provides a basis upon which future
courts may balance the rights conferred by a trademark and the Com-
munity's interest in the free movement of goods.
Price discrepancies among Member States of the European Union
(EU) have resulted in a practice known as "parallel imports," whereby
individuals purchase products on the market in low-price countries, ex-
port them to high-price countries for resale at a profit, and still under-
cut the manufacturer's official selling price.2 General principles of eco-
nomics suggest that such actions will continue as long as the costs of
transportation are less than the profit derived on resale. Thus, from a
consumer's standpoint, parallel imports are beneficial, providing the
same product at lower costs and in turn leading to price equalization
throughout the EU.
Unsurprisingly, manufacturers have a different viewpoint. A
trademark confers a right to proprietors to prevent, in the course of
trade, unauthorized use of the trademark that takes unfair advantage
* Douglas R. Hegg is a third year law student at the University of Denver College of
Law. The author wishes to thank his family and friends for their support and encour-
agement throughout his scholastic career. He wishes to extend special thanks to Sheila
for helping him through the rigors of law school.
1. See generally Andreas Reindl, Intellectual Property and Intra-Community Trade,
20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 819 (1997) (analyzing trademark functions, costs and benefits).
2. See Joined Cases C 427, 429 & 436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova [1996]
ECR 1-3457, 13 [hereinafter Bristol-Meyers-Squibb].
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of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the
trademark.' Since consumers regard a trademark as an indication of
the quality and identity of the manufacturer of a given product, proprie-
tors of a trademark have a legitimate interest in protecting the integ-
rity of the trademark.4
Manufacturers initially attempted to restrain parallel imports
through claims of trademark infringement resulting from the repack-
aging of the product.' In Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm
Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse GmbH, the ECJ
held that Article 36, in principle, grants a right to restrict the import of
repackaged goods upon which the trademark had been reattached.6 Ar-
ticle 36 of the EC Treaty permits quantitative restrictions on imports,
exports, or goods in transit that fall within specific categories of public
concern.
7
Nevertheless, the EC Treaty also provides that any such prohibi-
tions or restrictions may not "constitute a means of arbitrary discrimi-
nation or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States."8
The ECJ concluded that restrictions were an impermissible "disguised
restriction" on trade where: (1) use of the trademark right contributes
to the artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States; (2)
repackaging cannot adversely affect the original condition of the prod-
uct; (3) the proprietor of the mark receives prior notice of the marketing
of the repackaged product; and (4) it is stated on the new packaging by
whom the product has been repackaged.' Thus, though the limits are
ambiguous, Article 36 provides a measure of restraint from undue inter-
ference with free trade. The adoption of the First Council Directive (Di-
rective) raised additional questions as to the scope of Article 36."° Arti-
3. See First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Re-
lating to Trademarks, No. 89/104/EEC [1988], art. 5(2) 1989 O.J. (L 40)1 [hereinafter
First Council Directive].
4. See generally Reindl, supra note 1, at 854-57; See, e.g., N. Wilkof, Same Old
Tricks or Something New? A View of Trademark Licensing and Quality Control, 18 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 261, 268 (1996).
5. See also, Reindl, supra note 1, at 854-55. See generally Bristol-Meyers Squibb,
supra note 2.
6. Case 102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse GmbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1039, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (1978).
7. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Treaty of Rome), Feb. 7,
1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) art. 86 [hereinafter EC TREATY]
(grounds of public morality, public policy, or public security; the protection of health and
life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic,
historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property).
8. Id.
9. Id. 44.
10. See generally First Council Directive, supra note 3.
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cle 5 of the Directive codifies the rights conferred by a trademark.1 It
purports to grant broad rights against unauthorized third party use
which takes "unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the repute of the trademark."' 2 Such unauthorized use in-
cludes: a) affixing the sign to the goods or to the package thereof; b) of-
fering the goods, or putting them on the market under that sign; c) im-
porting or exporting the goods under the sign; and d) using the sign on
business papers and in advertising.'"
Nevertheless, the sweeping grant of rights to trademark proprie-
tors in Article 5 is limited by the doctrine of Exhaustion of Rights pro-
vided in Article 7.14 Pursuant to Article 7, a proprietor may not restrict
the use of his trademark in goods marketed within the Community by
the proprietor without his consent, unless a legitimate reason exists to
oppose further commercialization.'" A "legitimate reason" includes al-
teration or impairment to the goods after entering the Community
market.'
In Parfums Christian Dior SA & Anor v Evora BV (Dior), Christian
Dior took an alternate approach to limiting parallel imports.17  Dior
sought to prohibit resellers from advertising its products acquired
through parallel imports, thereby limiting the product's marketability
by parallel importers.' 8
The ECJ held that unauthorized advertising of parallel products
may only be opposed where such advertising results in significant dam-
age to the reputation of the trademark and its owner.' 9 The ECJ con-
cluded that what constitutes "significant damage" is a question of fact
for the national court. However, it did provide some guidance. As a
general rule, proprietors of a trademark should not be entitled to object
to "respectable advertising by respectable traders", even if there is some
damage to the product's luxurious image, resulting in advertising infe-
rior to that of selected distributors.2" The ECJ stated, however, that it
might be justifiable for a trademark proprietor of luxury perfumes to
oppose an advertisement which "depicted his perfumes heaped in a
sale-bin at cut-price prices along with rolls of toilet paper and tooth-
11. See id. art. 5.
12. See id. art. 5(2).
13. See id. art. 5(3).
14. See id art. 7.
15. See id. art. 7(1).
16. Id.
17. Case C-337/95, Parfumes Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV 1997 CELEX LEXIS
[1997] [hereinafter Dior].
18. See id. 1 6.
19. See id. 61.
20. See id. 1 51.
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brushes."2 Without explaining its reasoning, the ECJ concluded that
"resellers cannot be required to comply with the same conditions as se-
lected distributors.
22
With this holding, the ECJ promoted the equalization of pricing by
extending the principle of the Exhaustion of Rights to the advertising
and marketing of trademarked goods. In doing so, it eliminated a po-
tential "disguised restriction on trade between Member States," and ef-
fectively promoted the use of parallel imports as a means of price
equalization. 2' The holding makes clear that the rights of a trademark
proprietor cannot outweigh the interests of the European Community.
II. THE CASE IN CHIEF
A. Facts
In Dior, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands), referred six questions for preliminary ruling to the
ECJ. 24 The essential question was whether a trademark conveys upon
the proprietor authority to prevent unauthorized advertising, even
when conducted in a manner customary to the trade.25
Parfums Christian Dior SA (Dior France) is the manufacturer of
"luxury" perfumes and other cosmetic products, which it sells at pre-
mium prices. It utilizes a selective distribution system, whereby se-
lected retailers only supply ultimate customers or other selected retail-
ers.2" Parfums Christian Dior (Dior Netherlands) is Dior France's sole
representative in the Netherlands. In addition, Dior France has exclu-
sive trademark rights in Benelux, including illustrations of the pack-
aging of the perfumes.27
The defendant, Evora, operates a chain of approximately 300
"health and beauty" retail stores under the subsidiary name Kruidvat.2"
Consumers in the Netherlands regard the stores as the "undisputed
number one" for the sale of luxury perfumes. 29  Kruidvat obtained
Christian Dior products by means of parallel imports, whereby products
21. Id. (nonetheless, the court further noted that the advertiser could not be pre-
vented from simply cutting prices).
22. Id.
23. EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 36.
24. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, at 11.
25. Id. 1 1.
26. See id. 1 2.
27. See id. 1 3.
28. See Case T-87/92, BVBA Kruidvat v. EC Commission, 1996, 4 C.M.L.R. 1046 (Ct.
First Instance 1997).
29. Id.
672 VOL. 27:4
PARFUMS CHRISTIAN DIOR
are purchased in low priced markets, exported to higher priced markets
for resale at a profit, and yet still undercut the manufacturer's official
selling price.3 0 As part of a 1993 Christmas promotion, Kruidvat adver-
tised several Dior perfumes.3 1 The advertisements depicted the pack-
aging and bottles of some Christian Dior products in a manner custom-
ary to retail traders in the relevant sector.12 Nevertheless, Dior France
had not consented to the advertising and commenced proceedings to
prohibit Evora from making any use of its picture trademarks. 3
Dior claimed that its trademark had been used "either in breach of
its exclusive right to use the mark in respect of the same or similar
goods," or "in circumstances liable to cause it damage, by, inter alia,
impairing the prestige and image of the marks."34 Dior sought an order
to prevent Evora from making any publication or reproduction of Dior's
trademarks in unauthorized catalogues, brochures, advertisements, or
otherwise."
B. Procedural History
The Arrondissementsrechtbank Haarlem (district court) ordered
Evora to desist from using Dior's trademark "in a manner not conform-
ing to Dior's customary manner of advertising."36 Evora appealed to the
Gerechtshof (regional court of appeals). Dior argued before the Ger-
echtshof that a change in the "condition of the products" required under
Article 7(2) of the First Council Directive (89/104)" 7 and in paragraph 3
of Article 13A of the Benelux Law, 8 included "mental condition," 9 de-
scribed as a product's "allure, prestigious image, and aura of luxury
surrounding the goods."40 The Gerechtshof reversed the district court
ruling and Dior appealed to the Hoge Raad.
As the highest national court, the Hoge Raad is obliged under Arti-
cle 10 of the Benelux Law to refer certain questions that interpret
30. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, at 14. See also Bristol-Myers Squibb, supra note
2, 3.
31. E.g. Eau Sauvage, Poison, Fahrenheit, Dune, and Svelte. See Dior, 1997 CELEX
LEXIS, 1 5.
32. Id.
33. Id. 16.
34. Id.
35. Id. J7.
36. Id.
37. First Council Directive supra note 3, art. 7(2) (to approximate the laws of the
Member States relating to trademarks).
38. Uniform Benelux Law on Trademarks concluded between Belgium, Luxembourg,
and Netherlands on March 19, 1962.
39. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 11 9-12.
40. Id. 1 12.
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Benelux Law to the Benelux Court for a preliminary ruling. Similarly,
under Article 177 of the EC Treaty, a "court or tribunal of a Member
State" must refer certain questions of EC Treaty interpretation to the
ECJ.4 In the interest of "procedural economy" the Hoge Raad referred
similar questions to both courts.4 2 It also asked the ECJ whether for
proceedings related to Benelux law, the highest national court or the
Benelux court is the court "against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law for purposes of Article 177.4"
With respect to the jurisdictional issue, the ECJ initially deter-
mined that the Benelux court is a "court or tribunal of a member state"
within the meaning of Article 177. 4" In addition, the court concluded
that the requirements of Article 177 are satisfied provided that the ECJ
has given a ruling at "some stage in the proceedings before the national
court takes a final decision."4 Thus, it makes little difference which
court (highest national court or the Benelux court) requests the rul-
ing.4 6 Nevertheless, the Court indicated that the purpose of Article 177,
as well as the interest of procedural economy, will often be best served,
if the ECJ is given the opportunity to rule in advance of the Benelux
court.47
C. Court's Holding and Analysis
The ECJ held that the principle of exhaustion of rights extends to
the advertising of trademarked goods.4 8 Article 7 permits the resale of
goods placed on the market in the Community by, or with the permis-
sion of, the proprietor of the trademark. 9 Therefore, the ECJ con-
cluded that "in principle" a reseller must be entitled to advertise the
goods which he is entitled to sell. °
41. See EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 177(c).
42. Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, at 1 13-14.
43. Id. 14.
44. Id. 1 27-28.
45. Id. 1 28.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Id. 1 30-33.
49. See First Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 7. Article 7- Exhaustion of the
rights conferred by a trademark states:
1. The trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in rela-
tion to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under
that trademark by the proprietor or with his consent.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the
proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where
the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on
the market. EC TREATY, supra note 7, art.7.
50. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS 31.
VOL. 27:4
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In support of this principle, the Court looked to the wording of Arti-
cles 5 and 7.51 Article 5(3)(d) specifies that the rights conferred by the
trademark extend to preventing others from "using the sign on business
papers and in advertising."2 Article 7(1), in espousing the exhaustion
principle, also refers to the "use" of the trademark. Thus, the Court
51. Article 5 of the EC TREATY, Rights Conferred by a Trademark states:
1. The registered trademark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights
therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not hav-
ing his consent from using in the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is Identical with the trademark in relation to goods or
services which are Identical with those for which the trademark is regis-
tered;
(b) any sign where, because of its Identity with, or similarity to, the trade-
mark and the Identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the
trademark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of
the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and
the trademark.
2. Any Member State may also provIde that the proprietor shall be entitled
to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of
trade any sign which is Identical with, or similar to, the trademark in rela-
tion to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade-
mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State
and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trademark.
3. The following, inter alia, may be prohibited under paragraphs 1 and 2:
(a) affixing the sign to the goods or to the packaging thereof;
(b) offering the goods, or putting them on the market or stocking them for
these purposes under that sign, or offering or supplying services thereunder;
(c) importing or exporting the goods under the sign;
(d) using the sign on business papers and in advertising.
4. Where, under the law of the Member State, the use of a sign under the
conditions referred to in 1 (b) or 2 could not be prohibited before the date on
which the provisions necessary to comply with this Directive entered into
force in the Member State concerned, the rights conferred by the trademark
may not be relied on to prevent the continued use of the sign.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not affect provisions in any Member State relat-
ing to the protection against the use of a sign other than for the purposes of
distinguishing goods or services, where use of that sign without due cause
takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or
the repute of the trademark.
EC TREATY, supraI note 7, art.5. Article 7 of the EC Treaty, Exhaustion of the Rights
Conferred by a Trademark, states:
1. The trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in rela-
tion to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under
that trademark by the proprietor or with his consent.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the
proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where
the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on
the market.
EC TREATY, supra note 7, art.7.
52. Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 1 32.
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concluded that "use" extends to advertising and therefore, application of
the exhaustion principle permits resellers not only to resell such goods,
but also to advertise. 3
The ECJ then considered whether any exceptions existed to the
general rule of exhaustion as applied to advertising.5 4 In Bristol-Myers
Squibb v. Paranova (Bristol-Meyers Squibb), the ECJ held that damage
to a trademark owner's reputation can be a legitimate reason within the
meaning of Article 7(2) for a trademark owner to oppose the further
marketing of goods placed on the market in the Community by the pro-
prietor or with his consent.5 " In light of that holding, the ECJ concluded
that the repackaging must not be "defective, of poor quality, or un-
tidy." 6
The ECJ reasoned from Bristol-Meyers Squibb that a proprietor of
a trademark is similarly entitled to oppose shoddy advertising that
damages his reputation." Nonetheless, "condition of the goods" is dis-
tinguishable from "mental condition of the goods."5 8 The phrase "condi-
tion of the goods" in Article 7(2) merely refers to the condition of the
goods inside the packaging.9 Thus, change or impairment of the condi-
tion of the goods is one example of a "legitimate reason" within the
meaning of Article 7(2) and damage to reputation is another.6 °
In establishing damage to reputation, the proprietor need only
show risk of significant damage to his reputation, and need not show
that the public believed the retailer to be connected to, or authorized by
him.6 ' Whether or not there is a risk of significant damage is a ques-
tion of fact for the national court.6 2
The ECJ did note, however, several factors that may indicate
whether or not there is a risk of significant damage including: 1) evi-
dence that authorized distributors have carried out similar advertising
without complaint from the trademark owner; 2) evidence that the se-
lective distribution system is objectionable under the provisions of the
treaty as unnecessary for the type of product in question; or 3) evidence
that the trademark owner had not taken the trouble to set up a "water-
tight" distribution system.6
3
53. Id. 133.
54. Id. 1 34-55.
55. See generally Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 2.
56. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, at 1 35.
57. Id. 1 36.
58. Id. 38.
59. Id. 58.
60. Id. 38.
61. Id. 1 39.
62. Id. 1 50.
63. Id.
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The appropriateness of the advertising is also essentially a question
of fact for the national court." But the ECJ did propose that where the
advertising is similar to authorized distributors, there is no risk of sig-
nificant damage to the reputation of the trademark." Additionally,
even where such advertising is inferior to that of selected distributors,
the court proposed that such evidence itself is insufficient. "Resellers
cannot be required to comply with the same conditions as selected dis-
tributors. ' 66 Nonetheless, there may be "exceptional" circumstances to
which the proprietor of the trademark may object.67
The sales in question were from chemist shops, and Dior conceded
that Kruidvat's advertising complied with customary retail standards in
the relevant sector. 8 Thus, the ECJ concluded that although a trade-
mark owner may object to advertising, and such damage may include
damage to a product's luxurious image, the proprietor must properly
substantiate claims of significant damage to the reputation of the
trademark.69
III. RELEVANT LAW
Dior's claims relied upon the rights conferred by Articles 5 and 7 of
the First Council Directive. 0 The ECJ balanced these rights against
the mandate of free movement of goods provided in Articles 30 and 36 of
the EC Treaty.
7 1
Article 5 establishes the rights conferred by a trademark and pro-
vides the basis of Dior's claims. Specifically, Article 5(2) protects the
proprietor of a trademark from unauthorized use of its trademark
where such use takes "unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the dis-
tinctive character or the repute of the trademark.7 2 In addition, Article
5(3) includes using the trademark in advertising as a possible prohib-
ited use. 3
The rights conferred by Article 5 are constrained by the exhaustion
principle of Article 7. Article 7(1) establishes the principle of exhaus-
64. Id. 1 51.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. 51-52 (sale of luxury perfumes in "bargain bin" with toilet paper, or
sales by "Seedy" red-light district shops).
68. Id. 141.
69. Id. 161.
70. See First Council Directive, supra note 3, arts. 5, 7.
71. See EC TREATY, supra note 7, arts. 30, 36.
72. First Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 5(2).
73. See First Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 5(3)(b).
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tion of trademark rights, whereby a trademark owner cannot rely on his
trademark to oppose the importation or marketing of a product mar-
keted by him or with his consent in another Member State. 4 Article
7(2) excludes from that principle commercialization of goods where the
condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put
on the market. 5
In Dior, the products in issue were not altered physically after be-
ing placed on the market. Therefore, Dior claimed that the advertising
used to promote Kruidvat's sale of the product was detrimental to the
product's "mental condition."7 " Thus, Dior sought to assert the rights
conferred by Article 5 and avoid the exhaustion principle of Article 7 by
claiming that the advertising was detrimental to the "luxurious image"
of Dior.
Article 30 of the EC Treaty prohibits quantitative restrictions on
imports between Member States. 7 However, Article 36 provides excep-
tions to import restrictions on the following grounds: (1) public moral-
ity, policy, or security; (2) protection of health or life of humans, ani-
mals or plants; (3) protection of national artistic, historic, or
archaeological treasures; or (4) protection of industrial or commercial
property. 8 Yet such restrictions are permitted only if they do not con-
stitute a means of "arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States."7 9
IV. ANALYSIS
The free movement of goods, as established in Article 1 of the EC
Treaty, is one of the most important principles of European law."0 Arti-
cle 30 is another fundamental provision of the EC Treaty, clearly re-
flecting the drafters' intent to ensure a single European market."' Par-
allel imports are a reaction to intra-Community price discrepancies that
provides a means of price equalization. Parallel importers, therefore,
play an important role in market integration and equalization.
Critics of parallel imports argue that unrestricted parallel trade
74. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 1 30.
75. First Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 7(2).
76. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS 1 12.
77. EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 30 ("Quantitative restrictions on imports and all
measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States").
78. See EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 36.
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 1.
81. See Case 249/81, In Re "Buy Irish" Campaign, 1982 E.C.R. 4005, 4021-23, (1982]
2 C.M.L.R. 104, 123-24 (1983).
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may result in higher uniform prices at which low demand countries
may be unable or unwilling to purchase such goods.8 2 The result would
be lower demand, reduced output, and higher prices. Additionally, the
critics argue, removing price discrepancies may serve as a disincentive
to research, development, and production output levels.
8 3
Both notions disregard the basic assumption that the issue of par-
allel imports will only arise where the importer may make a profit. The
importer must determine what products have sufficient discrepancies in
prices to outweigh the costs of transportation and importation. The
parallel importer, in effect, provides marketing information to the
manufacturer as to appropriate pricing. Thus, the parallel importer,
provides the proprietor notice of the inadequate pricing, distribution, or
marketing in both the home market and in the nation of export.
Furthermore, parallel imports will not eliminate price discrepan-
cies, they will only limit the spread. Where the costs of importation and
transportation for the parallel importer outweigh the profit, the impor-
tation will cease. Economies of scale favor the proprietor in transporta-
tion and distribution. In addition, since the proprietor sets the initial
price, there is necessarily a delay before the parallel importer realizes
the discrepancy exists and determines that it is sufficient to act. The
proprietor thus benefits from the initial imperfect market information.
He can also capitalize on the parallel importer's imperfect marketing
information to head off unauthorized sales of his products. Further-
more, since the proprietor always maintains the option of altering its
pricing scheme, he may decrease the price discrepancy by simply low-
ering his prices, thereby making it not worth the parallel importer's
while.
Another concern about parallel imports arises from one interpreta-
tion of the function of a trademark. The ECJ traditionally has empha-
sized the role of trademarks as an indication of the origin of products.84
Other functions of a trademark include communication, investment, or
advertising. 5 These additional functions arguably go to the goodwill of
the product in question. 6 As such, a primary purpose of the trademark
82. See generally W. Bishop, Price Discrimination Under Article 86: Political Econ-
omy in the European Court, 44 MOD L. REV. 282 (1981); Malueg & Schwartz, Parallel Im-
ports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price Discrimination, Economic Analysis
Group Discussion Paper 6-12 (1993); Reindl, supra note 1, at 830-31.
83. See Reindl, supra note 1, at 831.
84. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS 139.
85. Id. See generally DAVID C.L. PERKINS & MARLEEN VAN KERCKHOVE, LICENSING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE EU: THE COMMUNITY EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE,
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (1997); Reindl, supra note 1, at 855.
86. See generally Reindl, supra note 1, at 855.
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is to provide assurance of the quality as well as the origin of the prod-
uct.
The ECJ defined the essential function of the trademark as "to en-
able the consumer, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish
the marked product from products of different origins."87 Such guaran-
tee of origin includes the assurance that the marked product has not
been subject to interference by a third party, without authorization of
the proprietor of the trademark.8 8
Legitimate concerns arise when the parallel importer repackages a
product prior to importation. Such occasions are due to diversified
packaging requirements for various Member States.89 However, the
ECJ concluded that restrictions on parallel imports were an impermis-
sible disguised restriction on intra-Community trade unless four re-
quirements were met: (1) use of the trademark right contributed to the
artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States; (2) re-
packaging adversely affected the original condition of the product; (3)
the proprietor of the mark did not receive prior notice of the marketing
of the repackaged product; and (4) the new packaging did not contain
information concerning by whom the product had been repackaged.9
Thus, so long as the integrity of the product remains intact, the proprie-
tor of the trademark may not oppose repackaging and marketing of its
product.
The general proposition remains that the primary purpose of a
trademark is to signify the origin of the product to the purchaser. This
signal includes the perceived quality, manufacturer, and any goodwill
associated with the product. So long as the integrity of the product re-
mains intact, the proprietor is assured that the product they marketed
in one Member State is equivalent to the parallel imported product into
another Member State. The only adverse consequence to the manufac-
turer, therefore, is that any price discrepancy results in profits for the
parallel importer, and not the proprietor. Thus, parallel imports en-
courage price equalization, at least to the point where the importer's
transportation and importation costs outweigh the profit resulting from
the price discrepancy.
The present case provides an example of a manufacturer's attempt
to prohibit parallel imports in order to maintain their exclusive market.
The product was unaltered in content and packaging. In addition, the
advertising complied with the general practice in the relevant industry.
87. See Case 107/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm Vertiebsgesellchaft Phar-
mazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH ECR 957 (1977).
88. Id.
89. See Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 2.
90. Id.
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Dior asserted that by not selling its product in an approved distributor-
ship, the parallel import damaged the luxurious image of its product.
This argument was merely smoke and mirrors.
In reality, Dior's trademark was secure. The product sold was the
identical product sold in approved distributorships. The marketing was
appropriate for the product in the market in which it was being sold.
Furthermore, there was no question as to whether Kruidvat was an
authorized Dior retailer. Thus, the only damage to Dior was the loss of
its exclusive market.
The ECJ was careful to assert that the risk of serious damage to a
trademark's reputation was a question of fact for the national court.
This provides trademark proprietors with protection from actions seri-
ously detrimental to its trademark, such as where a luxurious perfume
is sold in a "seedy" red-light district shop, or advertised in a "sale-bin at
cut-price prices along with rolls of toilet paper and toothbrushes."9 It
does not, however, provide the blanket trademark protection that Dior
sought. Furthermore, the opinion indicates that only such extreme
situations should result in protection.2
With the Dior decision, the ECJ promoted the goals of the EC
Treaty, especially that of encouraging the free movement of goods. Par-
allel imports provide a means of encouraging the concommitant price
equalization. So long as the manufacturer's product is secure in quality
and appearance, the market should dictate its cost. Allowing trade-
mark proprietors to assert rights prohibiting the free movement of
goods discourages market equalization and perpetuates price discrep-
ancies, contrary to those goals.
Finally, the principles of market equalization only apply to intra-
Community trade. 3 Proprietors control the prices at which they sell
their product within the Community. They may choose the markets to
distribute their product with an understanding of potential parallel
trade. They may then weigh the costs and benefits of price discrepan-
cies. Additionally, the proprietor controls the quantity of the product
introduced into a given market. Where parallel imports originate from
a particular Member State, the trademark proprietor may increase its
costs or limit the quantity of product marketed within that State,
thereby economically achieving the same result.
As a result, there remains no reason to perpetuate price discrepan-
cies. The benefits accrue only to the proprietor of the trademark, and
91. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 11 51-52.
92. Id. 1 51-52.
93. See EC TREATY, surpra note 7, art. 30 (restrictions prohibited between Member
States); id. art. 36 (prohibiting arbitrary or disguised restrictions on trade between Mem-
ber States).
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such practice defeats the specific purpose of the EC Treaty. Dior and
Bristol Meyers Squibb maintain the necessary protection to the trade-
marked product, while encouraging the free movement of goods.
V. CONCLUSION
Through the guise of protecting the "luxurious image" of its prod-
ucts, Dior sought to perpetuate favorable price discrepancies among the
Community nations. 4 The ECJ rejected Dior's argument that damage
to the "condition of the goods" includes not only actual damage, but also
"mental damage." It also concluded that the proper interpretation of
Article 7, accounting for the Community goal of free movement of goods,
prohibited the owners of trademarks from encouraging price discrepan-
cies between countries.9 '
As discussed above, utilization of parallel imports encourages
equalization. The ECJ, through its limited reading of Article 5 of the
EC Treaty, further protected parallel importers. To hold otherwise
would have provided the proprietors of a trademark with excessive con-
trol over their products' marketing, perpetuating price discrepancies.
Through the threat of lawsuits, proprietors could also have made it all
but impossible for parallel importers to advertise their products. This
would give exclusive distributors and retailers a competitive edge, con-
tradicting and frustrating the purpose of the "exhaustion of rights" in
Article 7.
That is not to say that a reseller's rights are absolute in regards to
advertising of trademarked goods. The ECJ acknowledged, in principle,
that protection of a proprietor's trademark from damage to its reputa-
tion may be a legitimate interest under Article 7(2). Nevertheless, it
placed the burden of establishing "serious damage" to a trademark upon
the owner of the trademark. The ECJ further noted that where a re-
seller habitually markets articles of the same kind, although not of the
same quality, the trademark owner must provide specific circumstances
of serious damage to the reputation of the trademark.
The ECJ additionally limited trademark owner's rights to control
reseller's advertising under Article 30 of the EC Treaty. Article 30 pro-
hibits obstacles to the free movement of goods, unless justified under
the exceptions set forth in Article 36. Citing Bristol-Meyers Squibb, the
ECJ initially noted that Article 7 of the Directive and Article 36 of the
94. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 1 48 (the Gerechtshof concluded that Dior wished
to prohibit all advertising and thus hinder the sale of products so as to protect its selective
distribution system against parallel importers).
95. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 1 32-38.
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EC Treaty must be interpreted in the same way. 6 The ECJ thus con-
cluded that the proper interpretation of Articles 30 and 36 prohibited
the proprietor of a trademark from opposing marketing by resellers."
The ECJ further expanded its holding to copyrighted materials.
Citing Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. Gesellschaft fuer Musika-
lische Auffuhrngs-und Mechanishe Vervielfaeltigungsrechte,98 the ECJ
concluded that the grounds of protection conferred by Article 36 to in-
dustrial and commercial property also included protection of copy-
righted items. The ECJ further noted, however, that the protection af-
forded copyrighted material may not be broader that that conferred on a
trademark owner.99
The ECJ's holding in Dior eliminated a potential barrier to parallel
imports, promoted price equalization, and furthered the EC Treaty goal
of free movement of goods. In the final analysis, therefore, the holding
was good for the European economy.
96. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 1 53 (citing Bristol-Meyers Squibb supra note 2.
97. Id. 54.
98. Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. Gesellschaft
fuer Musikalische Auffuhrngs-und Mechanishe Vervielfaeltigungsrechte [1981].
99. Id. 58.
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